Co-operative and Competitive Federalism in Post-1991 India: Tensions, Transformations, and the Political Economy of Fiscal Devolution The federal design of the Indian Constitution reflects a delicate balance between unity and diversity, combining strong centripetal features with space for state autonomy. Federalism in India was conceived as "holding together" rather than "coming together," with the Constitution … Continue reading Analyse the tensions between co-operative and competitive federalism in post-1991 India’s political economy. Assess the impact of centrally sponsored schemes and fiscal devolution on the realisation of co-operative federalism in India.
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To what extent does centralized planning undermine the principles of federalism, and in the context of India’s post-1991 liberalization, can decentralized governance be regarded as a more viable framework for balancing efficiency, autonomy, and democratic participation?
Centralized Planning, Federalism, and the Prospects of Decentralized Governance in Post-Liberalization India The tension between centralized planning and federalism represents a persistent dilemma in modern political economies, particularly in states characterized by diversity, regional asymmetries, and complex social structures. In the Indian case, this tension has been acute. India’s federalism—constitutionally entrenched yet tilted towards the … Continue reading To what extent does centralized planning undermine the principles of federalism, and in the context of India’s post-1991 liberalization, can decentralized governance be regarded as a more viable framework for balancing efficiency, autonomy, and democratic participation?