How does the classical conception of sovereignty, rooted in Bodinian and Westphalian traditions, reconcile with the post-1945 internationalization of human rights norms that challenge the state’s exclusive jurisdiction over its citizens? Does the evolution of international human rights regimes signify a paradigmatic shift from a “state-centric” to a “person-centric” order in international law, or merely a reconfiguration of power under global governance?

Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the Person in International Law: Continuity, Constraint, and Reconfiguration The classical conception of sovereignty — most familiarly associated with Jean Bodin’s articulation of indivisible, perpetual, and supreme authority and with the doctrinal consolidation commonly traced to the Peace of Westphalia — posits the state as the ultimate locus of legal and … Continue reading How does the classical conception of sovereignty, rooted in Bodinian and Westphalian traditions, reconcile with the post-1945 internationalization of human rights norms that challenge the state’s exclusive jurisdiction over its citizens? Does the evolution of international human rights regimes signify a paradigmatic shift from a “state-centric” to a “person-centric” order in international law, or merely a reconfiguration of power under global governance?