Assess the strategic ramifications of India’s transition from the ‘Look East Policy’ to the ‘Act East Policy’ in the context of evolving regional geopolitics and India’s Indo-Pacific engagement.

Assessing the Strategic Ramifications of India’s Transition from the ‘Look East Policy’ to the ‘Act East Policy’ in the Context of Evolving Regional Geopolitics and India’s Indo-Pacific Engagement

Abstract

India’s foreign policy evolution from the ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP) of the early 1990s to the more assertive ‘Act East Policy’ (AEP) since 2014 marks a decisive recalibration of its strategic priorities in Asia. While the LEP was predominantly economic and diplomatic, the AEP integrates deeper security, defense, and maritime dimensions, particularly in the Indo-Pacific context. This paper critically examines the strategic ramifications of this transition, situating it within the framework of regional power shifts, China’s assertiveness, the redefinition of Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, and India’s growing ambition to project itself as a key regional and global actor. Drawing on international relations theories and contemporary strategic debates, the paper assesses how the AEP enhances India’s regional footprint, the challenges it faces, and its broader implications for India’s role in the evolving multipolar order.


1. From ‘Look East’ to ‘Act East’: Policy Shift and Strategic Significance

1.1. Origins of the ‘Look East Policy’

Launched under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s, the Look East Policy emerged as a post-Cold War foreign policy pivot, emphasizing economic liberalization, trade expansion, and diplomatic outreach to Southeast Asia and East Asia (Muni, 2011). It sought to overcome India’s earlier continental inwardness, integrate with dynamic Asian economies, and deepen ties with ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea.

However, LEP remained primarily an economic and diplomatic framework, with limited focus on security cooperation, maritime strategy, or institutional leadership.


1.2. Emergence of the ‘Act East Policy’

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Act East Policy, formally articulated in 2014, signaled an upgraded and action-oriented approach, integrating:

  • Deeper defense and maritime cooperation.
  • Active participation in Indo-Pacific security architecture.
  • Strategic alignment with ASEAN centrality and major powers like Japan, Australia, and the U.S.
  • Expansion of connectivity, both physical (roads, ports, infrastructure) and normative (values of a rules-based order).

The AEP thus reflects India’s transition from economic engagement to strategic activism, aligning with its growing global profile and regional aspirations.


2. Strategic Ramifications in the Indo-Pacific Context

The AEP is deeply embedded in the geostrategic construct of the Indo-Pacific, which reimagines the interconnectedness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single strategic space (Pant & Rajagopalan, 2020). This reframing has profound implications.


2.1. Countering China’s Assertiveness

China’s rise and its assertive behavior—especially through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), militarization of the South China Sea, and the String of Pearls strategy—pose significant challenges to regional stability and India’s interests.

The AEP enables India to:

  • Build strategic partnerships with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. to counterbalance China.
  • Engage in maritime capacity-building in Southeast Asia, enhancing freedom of navigation and overflight.
  • Participate actively in Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and minilateral platforms, reinforcing a shared vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific (Rej, 2021).

This marks a shift from hedging under the LEP to active balancing under the AEP.


2.2. Strengthening Maritime Strategy

The AEP dovetails with India’s maritime doctrines such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).

Key strategic ramifications include:

  • Expanded naval deployments and exercises (e.g., Malabar with the U.S. and Japan, AUSINDEX with Australia).
  • Enhanced presence in critical sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), particularly the Malacca Strait, vital for energy and trade security.
  • Forward-looking maritime partnerships with island nations like Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

Thus, the AEP embeds maritime power at the heart of India’s Indo-Pacific engagement, signaling a departure from LEP’s continental focus.


2.3. Enhancing Connectivity and Regional Integration

Through initiatives like the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, the AEP seeks to:

  • Integrate India’s Northeast with Southeast Asia, boosting regional trade and economic development.
  • Provide alternative connectivity routes countering China’s BRI.
  • Enhance India’s role in shaping regional norms and infrastructure standards, aligning with the Japan-led Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC).

Such projects underscore the AEP’s ambition to position India as a connectivity provider and regional stakeholder.


3. Challenges and Limitations

While the AEP enhances India’s regional standing, several limitations temper its strategic efficacy.


3.1. Capacity Constraints

India faces significant constraints in:

  • Infrastructure delivery: Long delays in completing key projects like the Trilateral Highway undermine credibility.
  • Defense budget limitations: Compared to China’s military spending, India’s maritime and expeditionary capabilities remain modest.
  • Institutional capacity: Bureaucratic inefficiencies and lack of coordination impede timely policy execution.

3.2. Regional Perceptions and Asymmetries

Despite India’s outreach, Southeast Asian states:

  • Remain cautious about India’s strategic weight relative to China.
  • Prioritize ASEAN centrality and often resist hard balancing alignments like the Quad.
  • Expect greater economic engagement from India, which lags behind China’s scale of investments and trade.

Thus, the AEP must balance strategic ambition with local sensitivities, ensuring inclusivity rather than polarization.


3.3. Managing Strategic Partnerships

India’s growing alignment with the U.S., Japan, and Australia raises questions about:

  • Balancing strategic autonomy with security cooperation.
  • Avoiding entanglement in extra-regional tensions, such as U.S.–China rivalry.
  • Managing divergent interests within the Quad, particularly on issues like economic decoupling or military escalation.

Maintaining a principled yet flexible approach is essential for India’s long-term strategic positioning.


4. Broader Implications for India’s Global Role

The AEP is not merely a regional policy but a building block of India’s aspiration as a leading power in the multipolar world.

  • It enhances India’s normative agency in shaping the Indo-Pacific’s rules-based order, digital standards, and maritime governance.
  • It aligns with India’s efforts to reform global institutions, including the UN Security Council and WTO.
  • It reinforces India’s identity as a bridge between East and West, North and South, shaping multipolar balancing coalitions.

The AEP thus serves as both a regional strategy and a global projection platform.


Conclusion: Toward an Effective and Resilient Act East Policy

India’s shift from the Look East to Act East Policy marks a strategic maturation in its foreign policy, reflecting the imperatives of a more complex, contested, and interconnected regional environment. While the AEP amplifies India’s economic, security, and normative footprint in the Indo-Pacific, its long-term success depends on addressing capacity constraints, deepening regional trust, and aligning strategic ambition with pragmatic delivery.

To fully realize the potential of the AEP, India must invest in institutional coherence, maritime power, economic outreach, and diplomatic agility—transforming itself from a reactive continental power to an active shaper of the Indo-Pacific regional order.



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