The Communitarian Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism: Rethinking the ‘Liberal Self’ in the Theory of Justice
Abstract
John Rawls’s theory of justice, particularly as formulated in A Theory of Justice (1971), has been widely lauded for reviving normative political philosophy through its emphasis on fairness, individual rights, and impartiality. Central to his framework is the conception of the ‘liberal self’—a moral agent defined independently of its social attachments and communal ties. This essay critically examines how communitarian thinkers such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair MacIntyre have challenged this conception of the self as overly individualistic, abstract, and detached. It argues that the communitarian critique exposes the limitations of Rawlsian liberalism in capturing the embedded, historically situated nature of moral and political agency, and calls for a more relational understanding of justice that accounts for community, tradition, and shared values.
1. Introduction: Rawls and the Liberal Conception of the Self
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a model of justice built on two key principles: the equal basic liberties for all, and the difference principle, which allows inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged. These principles are chosen behind a “veil of ignorance” in the “original position,” where individuals are stripped of all knowledge of their social identities—class, gender, religion, ethnicity—so as to ensure impartial reasoning.
Underlying this construct is a liberal, deontological conception of the self: an autonomous moral agent capable of reasoning about justice prior to and independent of any particular conception of the good. This self is “unencumbered” in the sense that it is not defined by its community, tradition, or inherited social roles. For Rawls, such abstraction is necessary for impartiality and fairness.
However, this view has invited criticism from communitarian theorists, who argue that it misrepresents the nature of human agency and moral reasoning.
2. Michael Sandel: The Unencumbered Self and the Limits of Procedural Justice
In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), Michael Sandel offers a foundational critique of Rawls’s conception of the self. Sandel contends that Rawls’s “unencumbered self” is a fictional abstraction, one that fails to account for the constitutive role of communal and historical identities in shaping individual agency.
According to Sandel, the liberal self is conceived as a “bare chooser,” capable of stepping outside its values and affiliations to select principles of justice. This model, he argues, neglects the fact that individuals are often embedded in social practices and community ties that provide meaning and orientation. Justice, therefore, cannot be wholly detached from moral traditions and collective understandings of the good.
Sandel’s critique implies that Rawls’s original position is not neutral but reflects a particular cultural view—namely, a Western, liberal, individualist perspective. By claiming universality, Rawls’s framework arguably privileges one cultural model of the self over others, thus undermining its claim to impartiality.
3. Charles Taylor: The Dialogical and Embedded Self
Charles Taylor, in his essay “Atomism” (1985) and elsewhere, develops a dialogical conception of identity, arguing that the self is not formed in isolation but through relations of recognition with others. For Taylor, our moral capacities emerge through social practices, language, and shared narratives. The self is thus fundamentally embedded in a web of relationships and cultural meanings.
Taylor criticizes Rawls for treating freedom and autonomy as inherently prior to community, whereas in practice, individuals become capable of autonomy only through their socialization in particular ethical traditions. Taylor’s key point is that liberal theories like Rawls’s fail to appreciate the constitutive nature of community in moral development and political life.
In contrast to Rawls’s universalist rationalism, Taylor emphasizes cultural pluralism and ethical particularism, arguing that any theory of justice must account for the historical and communal dimensions of identity formation.
4. Alasdair MacIntyre: Tradition and the Narrative Self
Alasdair MacIntyre, especially in After Virtue (1981), mounts a broader critique of Enlightenment moral theory, of which Rawlsian liberalism is a part. MacIntyre argues that moral reasoning divorced from tradition and narrative becomes incoherent and arbitrary. For him, the self is not an isolated moral agent but a “narrative self,” whose identity is formed through historically situated practices and inherited roles.
MacIntyre contends that liberalism’s quest for neutral principles is misguided because morality is intelligible only within specific traditions. Justice, on this view, cannot be conceived apart from the virtues and communal practices that give it meaning. Rawls’s theory, in abstracting from these contexts, thus fails to provide a viable account of moral reasoning or civic life.
This critique undermines the foundational liberal claim that justice can be determined by purely procedural means. Instead, MacIntyre calls for a return to virtue ethics, rooted in communal life and shared goods.
5. Responses from Rawls and Liberal Defenders
Rawls himself addressed some of these critiques in his later work, Political Liberalism (1993). There, he distinguishes between a “comprehensive doctrine” and a “political conception” of justice, claiming that the liberal self was never meant to describe persons in all aspects of life, but only as citizens engaged in public reasoning. He introduces the idea of an “overlapping consensus”, where citizens with different moral and religious views can endorse the same political principles for different reasons.
While this move acknowledges the pluralism emphasized by communitarians, critics argue that Rawls still maintains an excessively abstract and proceduralist model, insufficiently attentive to the thick moral content of communal life.
Some liberal theorists, such as Amy Gutmann and Stephen Macedo, have sought to develop more context-sensitive and dialogical models of liberalism, incorporating insights from communitarianism while defending the core liberal values of individual rights, pluralism, and public reason.
6. Communitarianism: A Complement or a Challenge?
The communitarian critique does not necessarily reject liberal values like autonomy, rights, and equality. Rather, it challenges the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning those values in liberal theory. Communitarians call for:
- A more contextual account of personhood,
- Greater emphasis on civic virtue and social cohesion,
- Recognition of the moral authority of communal traditions.
In this sense, communitarianism may not be a wholesale alternative to liberalism, but a corrective to its excessive abstraction and proceduralism. By insisting on the embedded nature of moral agents, communitarians enrich the discourse on justice, urging political theorists to ground their principles in the actual moral and cultural lives of individuals.
7. Conclusion
The communitarian critique of Rawls’s conception of the liberal self has had a profound impact on the trajectory of political theory. By emphasizing the embedded, socially constructed, and dialogical nature of identity, thinkers like Sandel, Taylor, and MacIntyre challenge the foundational assumptions of Rawlsian liberalism. They argue that justice cannot be fully theorized through abstraction from the self’s communal attachments.
While Rawls’s later work sought to accommodate some of these concerns, the debate continues to shape contemporary discussions about multiculturalism, citizenship, and the ethical foundations of political life. The challenge posed by communitarianism underscores a fundamental question in democratic theory: Can justice be neutral with respect to conceptions of the good, or must it be rooted in shared forms of life and historical communities?
By reasserting the moral significance of community, tradition, and narrative, the communitarian critique not only questions liberal theory’s assumptions but also expands the possibilities for a more relational and context-sensitive vision of justice.
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