China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Impact on India–China Relations: Strategic Frictions, Economic Asymmetries, and Regional Security Implications
Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, is arguably the most ambitious transnational infrastructure and connectivity project of the 21st century. Encompassing over 150 countries and multiple corridors—maritime and overland—it seeks to reconfigure global trade routes, investment flows, and geostrategic alignments. Now entrenched in China’s foreign policy, the BRI functions not only as a vehicle for economic globalization with Chinese characteristics, but also as a geostrategic instrument for extending Beijing’s political influence across Eurasia and beyond.
For India, the BRI represents both a geoeconomic challenge and a strategic red line, particularly due to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)—a territory that India claims as its own. India’s formal opposition to BRI, most notably its boycott of all BRI Forums, has shaped the trajectory of India–China relations, deepening strategic mistrust and prompting competing visions for regional connectivity and security architecture in South Asia.
This essay explores how the BRI has influenced the strategic, economic, and geopolitical dimensions of India–China relations, and assesses its broader implications for regional connectivity, sovereignty, and security in South Asia.
1. Strategic and Political Impact on India–China Bilateral Relations
1.1. The CPEC Flashpoint and the Kashmir Question
India’s principal objection to the BRI stems from the CPEC, a flagship corridor under the BRI that traverses Gilgit–Baltistan, a part of the larger Jammu & Kashmir region claimed by India:
- India views CPEC as a direct violation of its territorial sovereignty, arguing that no third country can undertake infrastructure development in disputed territories without its consent.
- The move is seen as China’s implicit recognition of Pakistan’s control over PoK, undermining India’s legal position on Kashmir.
This has intensified strategic mistrust, particularly in the post-Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) military standoffs, leading India to reframe its China policy around strategic caution and competitive engagement.
1.2. Strategic Encirclement and the “String of Pearls” Anxiety
India interprets the BRI as part of a broader Chinese strategy of encirclement, where infrastructural investments in South Asian and Indian Ocean countries—Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Nepal—create dual-use logistics hubs that could serve both commercial and military purposes.
- Projects like Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar have raised concerns over China’s growing maritime footprint in India’s traditional sphere of influence.
- This perceived encirclement, often dubbed the “String of Pearls”, has triggered India’s counter-responses through enhanced naval diplomacy and the promotion of regional connectivity alternatives.
2. Economic Asymmetries and Connectivity Contestations
2.1. India’s Rejection of BRI: Sovereignty and Standards
Unlike most South Asian nations, India has consistently refused to join the BRI, citing multiple concerns:
- Opaque financing, leading to debt dependency—as seen in Sri Lanka’s lease of Hambantota Port to China for 99 years.
- Lack of transparency, environmental safeguards, and local community inclusion in BRI projects.
- The use of Chinese labor and materials, limiting local economic gains and creating enclave economies.
India has called for rule-based connectivity through its own initiatives, promoting sustainable, consultative, and sovereign-sensitive models of regional cooperation.
2.2. Competing Initiatives: India’s Alternative Vision
In response to BRI, India has strengthened alternative corridors and development partnerships:
- India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project seek to enhance connectivity with Southeast Asia under the Act East Policy.
- Chabahar Port in Iran, jointly developed with Afghanistan and Iran, is India’s strategic counter to Gwadar, providing access to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.
- India has partnered with Japan in the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), and more recently aligned with Western efforts like the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
These initiatives reflect India’s ambition to shape a multipolar connectivity framework resistant to unilateral Chinese influence.
3. Geopolitical Realignments and Regional Security Architecture
3.1. China’s Deepening Presence in South Asia
BRI has enabled China to become a dominant external actor in South Asia, eroding India’s historical regional primacy:
- Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives have all signed MoUs with China under BRI, receiving loans and infrastructure deals.
- China’s non-reciprocal diplomacy and “no-strings-attached” investments offer faster capital but often result in geopolitical leverage.
India now faces the challenge of maintaining regional influence while avoiding zero-sum competition that could destabilize smaller neighbors.
3.2. Militarization Risks and Dual-Use Infrastructure
The dual-use nature of BRI infrastructure raises security concerns:
- Ports developed under the guise of commerce may be converted into naval logistics bases.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and communications networks embedded within BRI corridors could be leveraged for strategic dominance.
This has prompted India to integrate maritime security into its foreign policy, evidenced in doctrines like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and greater participation in naval exercises with QUAD countries.
4. Broader Implications for Regional and Global Trade Architecture
4.1. Fragmentation of Multilateralism
BRI represents a China-led, state-capitalist model of globalization, diverging from the multilateral, rules-based systems championed by institutions like the WTO and ADB.
- India argues that BRI undermines global norms by promoting bilateral, debt-heavy arrangements rather than regionally inclusive, multilateral solutions.
- The marginalization of democratic consultation and local ownership in BRI projects has created backlash and resistance in countries like Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Kenya.
India’s abstention from BRI reflects a broader ideological divide over the future of global infrastructure governance.
4.2. Opportunity for Leadership and Norm Entrepreneurship
The BRI impasse offers India an opportunity to shape an alternative vision of connectivity:
- By emphasizing transparency, sustainability, and democratic norms, India can emerge as a normative leader in the Global South.
- Multilateral platforms like BIMSTEC, IORA, and ASEAN-India provide avenues to regionalize India’s developmental diplomacy.
India’s role in emerging corridors such as IMEC signals a coalitional approach to counter BRI, aligning with like-minded powers on infrastructure, digital norms, and supply chain resilience.
Conclusion
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has significantly altered the strategic, economic, and geopolitical contours of India–China relations. For India, BRI represents both a sovereignty challenge (via CPEC) and a systemic threat to its regional influence, prompting a recalibration of strategic partnerships, connectivity strategies, and regional diplomacy. The deepening BRI footprint in South Asia underscores the urgency for India to consolidate its developmental leadership, institutionalize regional platforms, and offer a value-based alternative model of cooperation.
In the broader geopolitical landscape, the BRI is not merely an economic project—it is a geostrategic narrative. How India responds to it—through strategic autonomy, normative positioning, and coalitional leadership—will determine not just the future of India–China relations, but also the emerging architecture of regional connectivity and security in South Asia and beyond.
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