To what extent has the emergence of coalitional politics reshaped the nature and functioning of federalism in India?

Reshaping Indian Federalism through Coalitional Politics: A Critical Appraisal


Introduction

The Indian federal structure, enshrined in the Constitution of 1950, was conceived as a quasi-federal arrangement—centralised in spirit but federal in form. Drawing inspiration from the Canadian and Australian models, the Constituent Assembly opted for a strong centre to maintain national unity in a context of communal partition, socio-political fragmentation, and post-colonial fragility. However, since the 1990s, the emergence and entrenchment of coalitional politics at the national level have led to a substantial recalibration of the Indian federal compact. The rise of regional parties, the proliferation of state-based political identities, and the consequent need for coalition governments at the Centre have gradually reshaped the functioning of Indian federalism, making it more accommodative, consultative, and negotiable.

This essay critically examines the impact of coalitional politics on Indian federalism, identifying the structural, functional, and normative shifts in centre-state relations. It contends that coalitional politics has fostered a more collaborative federal culture while also introducing new asymmetries and transactional logics into Indian political practice.


I. From Centralised Federalism to Political Federalisation

At its inception, Indian federalism was characterised by central dominance, facilitated by:

  • The overriding powers of Parliament under Articles 249, 250, and 356.
  • The residuary powers vested in the Union under Article 248.
  • The appointment and discretionary powers of Governors (Article 356 and Article 200).
  • The presence of centrally appointed All India Services and planning institutions.

This architecture enabled what Granville Austin described as “cooperative federalism within the framework of a centripetal Constitution.” However, the political landscape began to shift with the decline of Congress dominance and the rise of regional parties from the late 1960s onward.

The watershed moment arrived in the post-1989 era, marking the decline of single-party majority governments and the institutionalisation of coalition politics at the national level, beginning with the National Front government and later consolidated under the United Front, NDA, and UPA regimes. This transition heralded the political federalisation of India, where the Centre became increasingly dependent on state-level parties for parliamentary majority and coalition stability.


II. Functional Transformation of Federal Dynamics

1. Empowerment of Regional Parties

The most significant outcome of coalition politics has been the enhanced bargaining power of regional parties. Political formations such as the DMK, TDP, Shiv Sena, JD(U), Trinamool Congress, and BJD have used their pivotal position in coalition arrangements to influence national policy, extract greater financial allocations, and secure institutional representation.

Examples include:

  • The DMK and TDP securing key cabinet portfolios in coalition governments.
  • The TMC opposing central policies like the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC).
  • The SP and BSP influencing economic policy debates during UPA regimes.

This reflects what Arend Lijphart called consociational power-sharing, wherein peripheral and minority interests gain voice through elite bargaining.

2. Erosion of Unilateral Centralism

Coalition governments, lacking numerical dominance, have generally refrained from exercising coercive powers such as Article 356 and dismissals of state governments, which were frequently used by Congress in the 1960s–80s. The S.R. Bommai judgment (1994) further restrained central abuse of such provisions, and coalitional politics reinforced this judicial caution by promoting a culture of consultation over confrontation.

3. Greater Fiscal Accommodation

Coalitional governments have tended to pursue fiscal accommodation to appease coalition partners and state interests. Increased allocation under centrally sponsored schemes, expansion of fiscal transfers through Finance Commissions, and greater flexibility in state borrowing are manifestations of this trend.

The 14th and 15th Finance Commissions reflect this evolving logic, with increased untied devolution of resources (42% of divisible pool post-14th FC) and recognition of state-specific developmental needs.


III. Institutional Innovations and Collaborative Mechanisms

Coalitional politics has encouraged the development of horizontal intergovernmental mechanisms, reducing the earlier central unilateralism. Notable examples include:

  • Inter-State Council: Though constitutionally mandated, it gained renewed prominence during NDA-I and UPA-I for policy coordination.
  • National Development Council (NDC): Involved Chief Ministers in planning priorities until its replacement by the Governing Council of NITI Aayog.
  • Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council: A federal innovation that embodies collaborative fiscal federalism, although not a direct product of coalition politics, was shaped in an era of inter-party negotiation and coalition consultation.

These forums represent a move from administrative federalism to deliberative federalism, where states are not merely implementers but co-authors of national policies.


IV. New Challenges: Asymmetry, Partisan Federalism, and Transactionalism

While coalitional politics has promoted greater decentralisation and state assertion, it has also generated certain structural tensions within Indian federalism:

1. Asymmetrical Bargaining Power

Coalitional arrangements often lead to asymmetrical federalism, where influential parties/states extract disproportionate benefits. States that are part of the ruling coalition may receive preferential treatment, while opposition-ruled states may face fiscal neglect or administrative obstructions, especially in centrally sponsored schemes.

2. Rise of Partisan Federalism

As coalitions increasingly reflect ideological coalitions rather than national consensus, the space for neutral federal cooperation diminishes. The Centre’s relations with non-aligned or ideologically opposed state governments (e.g., West Bengal, Kerala, Delhi) have been marked by friction over issues such as:

  • Allocation of disaster relief.
  • Implementation of central laws (e.g., farm laws, CAA).
  • Use of investigative agencies like ED, CBI, and NIA.

3. Transactional Nature of Federalism

Coalitional politics may foster a patronage-based federalism, where alliances are built on opportunistic trade-offs rather than enduring institutional respect. Cabinet positions, financial packages, and infrastructural projects become transactional tools rather than elements of cooperative planning.


V. Contemporary Trends: Retreat of Coalitions and Re-Centralisation?

Since 2014, with the emergence of a majoritarian single-party government under the BJP, Indian federalism appears to be witnessing a partial re-centralisation. Key developments include:

  • Diminished role of NDC and Planning Commission.
  • Increased reliance on centrally sponsored schemes with conditionalities.
  • Recentralisation of education, health, and labour codes.
  • Conflicts with states over the GST compensation issue and governors’ roles.

Yet, the resilience of Indian federalism—its embedded plurality, linguistic diversity, and regional aspirations—ensures that centralising impulses are constantly negotiated, especially at the electoral level.


Conclusion

Coalitional politics has played a transformative role in reconfiguring the pragmatic architecture of Indian federalism. It has enhanced the political voice of states, institutionalised consensual governance, and curbed unilateral centralism, thereby deepening the federal ethos envisioned in the Constitution. However, it has also introduced asymmetries, opportunism, and transactionalism, which complicate the normative ideals of equitable and cooperative federalism.

The trajectory of Indian federalism is now shaped by a dynamic dialectic between electoral centralisation and governance decentralisation, where coalitional politics acts both as a moderating force and a source of friction. The future of federalism in India will depend not merely on constitutional texts but on the political culture, party system, and institutional innovations that sustain democratic pluralism in the world’s largest federal democracy.



Discover more from Polity Prober

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.