Political Contingencies versus Constitutional Provisions in Shaping Centre–State Relations in India: A Critical Assessment
Introduction
Indian federalism, as enshrined in the Constitution, was designed as a quasi-federal system, combining a strong central authority with autonomous state governments. However, the practical working of Centre–State relations has often diverged from the formal constitutional framework, influenced less by the written text and more by political contingencies, party configurations, and the evolving nature of democratic competition. This essay critically examines the extent to which the trajectory of Indian federalism has been shaped more by political dynamics than by constitutional design, focusing on key periods and patterns in post-independence Indian politics.
I. The Constitutional Framework: Centralisation by Design
India’s Constitution, influenced by both colonial administrative centralism and the urgent need for national integration, provided a strong Union government with the following centralising features:
- Article 246 and Seventh Schedule: The Union List contains more items and broader competencies than the State List.
- Article 356 (President’s Rule): Allows the Centre to dismiss state governments on the grounds of constitutional failure.
- Articles 200 and 201: Empower the Governor (a Central appointee) to reserve state bills for the President’s consideration.
- Fiscal Federalism: The Centre controls most revenue sources and redistributes through the Finance Commission and centrally sponsored schemes (CSS).
Yet, as Granville Austin observes, India’s federalism was intended not as a mechanical division of power, but as an instrument for achieving the integrative goals of a newly independent, diverse nation. The constitutional form was thus inherently flexible, creating space for political practices to shape the actual federal balance.
II. One-Party Dominance and Centralised Federalism (1950s–1967)
During the first two decades post-independence, the Indian National Congress (INC) dominated both the Centre and most states. This party system congruence created a relatively stable political landscape where constitutional provisions were rarely contested in spirit. Federalism operated more through intra-party consultation than through institutional checks.
- Chief Ministers were often dependent on the Prime Minister and party high command for leadership legitimacy.
- Despite constitutional asymmetries, conflicts were muted due to the vertical party integration of the Congress system (Morris-Jones).
This period witnessed the centralisation of planning, the establishment of centrally controlled institutions (e.g., All India Services), and the evolution of a unitary ethos under the guise of national development.
III. The Federal Turn: Regional Assertion and Political Fragmentation (Post-1967)
The 1967 General Elections marked a turning point, with Congress losing power in several major states. The emergence of non-Congress regional parties—e.g., DMK in Tamil Nadu, Akali Dal in Punjab—altered the political equilibrium.
- Centre–State tensions escalated, particularly over issues of language policy, revenue sharing, and cultural autonomy.
- The Central government responded by invoking Article 356 over 100 times between 1950 and 1990, often on partisan considerations.
For instance:
- In 1977 and 1980, newly elected Central governments dismissed state governments from opposing parties, reflecting a politicised use of constitutional powers.
The Sarkaria Commission (1983–88), constituted in response to these tensions, acknowledged that misuse of Article 356 had eroded federalism and recommended restraint and judicial oversight, though its recommendations were only partially implemented.
IV. Coalition Era and the Emergence of Negotiated Federalism (1989–2014)
The decline of Congress dominance and the rise of coalition politics significantly altered the Centre–State dynamic:
- Regional parties like TDP, DMK, Shiv Sena, SP, and later Trinamool Congress gained leverage at the Centre.
- Coalition governments at the Centre required state-based parties for survival, leading to a negotiated federalism that increased fiscal and political bargaining power for states.
Key developments:
- Finance Commissions began recommending greater tax devolution to states.
- Institutions like the Inter-State Council and Zonal Councils gained renewed attention.
- Despite constitutional continuity, federalism became more politically plural and decentralised.
This was further institutionalized with the creation of the Goods and Services Tax Council (GSTC) in 2016, representing fiscal federalism by consensus.
V. Post-2014 Centralisation: The Rise of Executive Federalism
With the return of a single-party majority government (BJP) in 2014 and 2019, India saw a reassertion of central control, though now exercised more through executive and fiscal instruments than constitutional coercion.
- Centralised decision-making through schemes like Ayushman Bharat, PM Kisan, and National Education Policy, often bypassing state-specific concerns.
- Allegations of fiscal centralisation under GST, with delays in compensation payments during COVID-19, triggered resistance from opposition-ruled states (e.g., Kerala, Punjab).
- Governor’s role once again came under scrutiny—e.g., in Maharashtra (2019), Puducherry (2021), and West Bengal (2022)—where partisan appointments allegedly interfered with elected state governments.
Despite constitutional boundaries, party asymmetry and Centre-driven governance narratives have led to a re-centralisation of federal power, exacerbated by the Centre’s control over investigative agencies, financial institutions, and emergency legislation (e.g., use of Epidemic Diseases Act, Disaster Management Act during the pandemic).
VI. Judicial Trends: Constitutional Correctives or Ambivalent Actor?
The Supreme Court of India, particularly post-S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), attempted to constrain the misuse of Article 356, ruling that presidential proclamations were subject to judicial review.
However, in many instances, the judiciary has been ambiguous in enforcing federal balance, particularly in fiscal matters and Centre–State disputes over institutions like the CAG, NIA, or UGC.
Moreover, the Court’s endorsement of cooperative federalism (e.g., in GST Council cases) sometimes belies the coercive undercurrents of political practice.
Conclusion
The trajectory of Centre–State relations in India demonstrates that constitutional law provides only a framework, but its spirit, content, and outcomes are shaped fundamentally by political practice. Political contingencies—such as single-party dominance, coalition compulsion, rise of regional parties, and central executive power—have consistently defined the nature of Indian federalism.
While the Constitution envisions a flexible but integrated federation, the politicisation of institutional roles (e.g., Governors, CBI, NITI Aayog) and the erosion of federal consultation mechanisms point to a trend toward centralised federalism under conditions of political asymmetry.
Thus, for Indian federalism to maintain its democratic ethos, the challenge lies not only in preserving constitutional structures but in fostering a culture of federal trust, intergovernmental respect, and institutional parity. Only then can the spirit of cooperative federalism envisioned by the Constitution be meaningfully realised.
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